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The issuance of securities by public utilities is regulated at both the federal
level by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and at the state level
by state public utility commissions (PUCs). In this Article, Professors Gorman,
Grace, and Vora critically assess the impact of these overlapping regulatory
jurisdictions. Generally, the SEC and some PUCs require utilities to award
underwriting contracts through a process of competitive bidding. While this
requirement disciplines managers, the authors observe that under a competitive
bid regime, an investment bank lacks the information to certify adequately a
stock issuance. The absence of adequate certification contributes to
underpricing, which adversely affects current shareholders.
The authors use a regression analysis to study the effects of multiple
regulators on participants in the securities issuance process. Their analysis
shows that, where competitive bidding is required, underpricing is most severe
when a state's regulatory climate is favorable to investors. From this
unexpected result, the authors conclude that the competitive bid requirement
interferes with the regulatory balance struck by the state PUCs. The authors
conclude further that the policies of the state PUCs can adversely affect the
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recommend that the SEC become the sole regulator of securities issuance by
public utilities.
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Introduction
The issuance of securities by public utilities is regulated at the state level
by public utility commissions (PUCs) l and federally by the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC). Because of the overlapping jurisdiction of these
regulatory bodies, policies implemented by the state PUCs affect the policy
objectives of the SEC. Likewise, policies implemented by the SEC can affect
the state PUCs' objectives.2
State PUCs are charged with regulating utilities in the public interest
because of the important role that utilities play in state economies.3
Traditionally, the PUCs' job has been to set fair, just, and reasonable rates,4
with an eye toward advancing economic efficiency.5 One important way in
which PUCs attempt to promote efficiency is by requiring utilities to obtain
competitive bids from investment bankers for the service of issuing new
securities. Under the powers granted by the Public Utility Holding Company
Act of 1935 (PUHCA),6 the SEC also possess the authority to require utility
1. For a general history of the growth of regulation and the burdens it puts on regulators, see THOMAS
K. MCGRAW, PROPHETS OF REGULATION (1984). For an interesting critique of the ability of the regulator
to regulate, see George J. Stigler & Claire Friedland, What Can Regulators Regulate?: The Case of
Electricity, 5 J. L. & ECON. 1 (1962).
2. The nature of overlapping jurisdictions is unique to electric utilities. Whereas many industries are
regulated by both the federal and state governments, a dividing line generally exists between interstate and
intrastate regulation. Electric utilities, however, must comply with both federal and state regulation of their
stockholders' return on capital.
3. For example, in 1986 transportation and public utility sectors contributed $391,440,000,000 or 9.3%
of total state gross product. U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STAT. ABSTRACT OF THE U.S. 1989 430 (1989).
4. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 46-2-23 (1982)(endows Georgia Public Service Commission with
exclusive power to determine "just and reasonable" rates).
5. Many regulatory policies are guided by the goal of economic efficiency. The Public Utility
Regulatory Policies Act (PURPA), 16 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2645 (1982), for example, requires that the state
investigate for potential use certain economically efficient rates. See Sanford V. Berg, PURPA, and Benefit-
cost Analysis for Innovative Rates, PUB. UTIL. FORT., October 8, 1981, at 21.
6. 15 U.S.C. § 79 (1988).
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holding companies and their subsidiaries to obtain competitive bids.7 The SEC
grants exemptions from this requirement only if the utility is unable to secure
competitive bids or if the SEC deems capital markets to be unsettled. This
policy of bringing the service to the consumer at the price closest to the "free-
market" price may be considered as an expression of the federal and state
governments' legislative and administrative willingness to regulate efficiently.
In theory, the regulator is a substitute for the constraints of the free market.
The regulator attempts to allocate resources in a manner consistent with a
competitive market outcome. Thus, the consumer pays a price reflecting that
which would be paid if the market were competitive, and the utilities' share-
holders receive a return on their investment reflecting actual risk and market
returns. If such a competitive outcome is duplicated through the regulatory
process, regulation is more likely to be "neutral" in its impact on various
economic agents. If, on the other hand, the regulatory process does not
duplicate the free market and the outcome of the regulation is differential, then
some groups benefit, perhaps at the cost of other groups. Such outcomes are
not considered desirable because they can reduce a society's economic well-
being.
Utilities must make regular visits to the capital markets to raise funds for
renewal and expansion of their assets.' When a utility issues new debt or
equity, part of the proceeds from the issue is paid to the investment banking
firm underwriting the issue. The fee charged by the underwriter is part of what
is termed the flotation cost - the total cost of selling the securities to investors
in the market. The SEC and/or the PUCs require utility holding companies,
their subsidiaries, and utilities under their jurisdiction to invite bids from
investment banks so as to prevent utility management from developing an
inefficient permanent business relationship with one investment banking firm.'
This requirement is designed to reduce costs to-ratepayers as well as to inves-
tors by preventing managers from putting their own interests ahead of those
of the utility.
In the absence of a competitive bid contract, management could go so far
as to secure kick-backs from the investment banking firm selected for a long-
7. 17 C.F.R. § 250.50 (1974). See the discussion on PUHCA and the competitive bid requirement at
Part 1, Section A, and the discussion of state enabling statutes and the competitive bid requirement at Part
II, Section B.
8. The non-transportation public utility sector expended $79.37 billion on new plants and equipment
in 1986. Nearly 43% of this sum was expended by electric utilities. To finance this asset-building, public
utilities raised $44.31 billion in capital markets, which accounted for 15.05% of all corporate security issues.
See Plant and Equipment Expenditures, the Four Quarters of 1987, SURVEY OF CURRENT BUSINESS, June
1987, at 19, 20; Domestic Financial Statistics, FEDERAL RESERVE BULLETIN, June 1987, at A3, A34.
9. See Termination of Temporary Suspension of the Competitive Bidding Requirement of Rule 50,
Public Utility Holding Company Act Release No. 18,898, 1975 SEC LEXIS 1947 (Mar. 28, 1975).
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term agreement for investment banking services.' 0 The SEC noted, in addition,
that once an investment banking firm develops a business relationship with a
utility, even without under-the-table payments, it is difficult to wrest away the
account." Such an alliance implies to competing investment banking firms
that the utility management may be indifferent to their proposals even though
these proposals could result in substantial savings to the utility.
The decision to employ a new investment bank can be costly to the utility
as well as to utility management because managers must invest time and effort
in evaluating a new underwriting service provider. Administrative costs may
be significant enough to discourage management from shopping around for a
lower price.' 2 State regulations assure utility owners a positive rate of return
in good times as well as bad. This assurance gives management less incentive
to cut costs which ultimately get passed on to ratepayers. Accordingly, one
could argue that the rule requiring competitive bidding prevents management
from shirking its duty and thus prevents management from failing to work in
the best interests of shareholders.
The alternative to an underwriting contract won through competitive bidding
is a negotiated contract. 3 In a normal competitive environment, ordinary
negotiated contracts do not cause incentive problems in the decision-making
behavior of managers." A utility manager, however, does not have the same
incentives as a manager in a competitive non-utility firm. A manager in a
competitive firm is encouraged to keep underwriting fees as low as possible
because shareholders have the ability to discipline the manager if the manager
10. It is possible to posit that shareholders who are concerned about managerial corruption would
simply sell their shares. This position, however, is not tenable for several reasons. If a group of
shareholders is indeed disenchanted with the management of a company, the price of the stock is likely to
be depressed. What shareholder would like to sell shares when the price is lower? Furthermore, historically,
utility stocks have been considered "ideal investment" for the long-term. By selling early, shareholders
are likely to lose the long-term capital appreciation. Finally, apart from the apparent appeal of "shareholder
activism" is the pragmatic view of shareholders that it is better to agitate and make management more
responsive to their desires than merely to cash out.
11. See Termination of Temporary Suspension of the Competitive Bidding Requirement of Rule 50,
supra note 9.
12. By contrast, the ability of a utility to choose an investment bank and use the firm repeatedly may
save the utility money in the long run. The current investment banking firm may be able to underwrite
securities more efficiently because it already possesses detailed information on the utility.
13. Despite the repeated finding that negotiated contracts are more expensive than competitively bid
contracts, the non-regulated companies, which include most manufacturing and commercial companies, enter
almost exclusively into negotiated contracts with investment banking firms. Ninety-seven percent of equity
and 85% of debt and preferred stock public offerings are issued through negotiated underwriting contracts.
RAMESH K. S. RAO, FiNANcIAL MANAGEMENT 489 (1992).
14. There are two explanations for the use of more expensive negotiated contracts. One explanation
stems from the perceived incentive incompatibility between managers and shareholders. The other
explanation arises out of the perceived need to monitor managers due to information asymmetry between
managers and shareholders. Investment bankers provide monitoring through negotiated contracts and this
monitoring is valued by shareholders who, as outsiders, possess less information than the insider managers.
Thus, agency problems and information asymmetry induce companies to use negotiated contracts for
investment banking services.
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does not attempt to maximize the shareholders' wealth.15 A manager of a
regulated utility does not have the same incentive to minimize costs because
this manager can pass the costs of business (in the present case, those of
underwriting) to the consumers rather than the shareholders. The consumers'
ability to discipline the manager is not as strong as that of the shareholders, 6
and as a result utility management might choose to use a negotiated contract
to gain from under-the-table payments. 7 Side-payments in cash or in kind are
clearly not in the best interest of shareholders if they cause managers to make
decisions which do not maximize the shareholders' wealth.
The total underwriting cost of an equity security flotation consists of the
15. The firm can be viewed as a set of contractual relationships among individuals. One of the
contractual claims is a residual claim (equity) on the firm's assets and cash flows. This equity claim is
defined as a principal-agent relationship with shareholders as the principals and the manager as the agent.
The shareholders force congruent interests on the manager by devising appropriate incentives for the
manager and then monitoring resulting behavior. See Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory
of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976).
Citing diffused ownership of the modem firm, Professor Williamson proposes that the manager's
objective is maximization of preferred expenses, whereas Professor Donaldson proposes that the manager's
objective is maximization of corporate wealth. Professor Williamson argues that there are some expenses
which provide greater value to the manager than to the company. Professor Donaldson argues that a
manager maximizes corporate wealth over which the manager has effective control. See Oliver E.
Williamson, Managerial Discretion and Business Behavior, 53 AM. ECON. REV. 1032, 1034-40 (1963);
GORDON DONALDSON, MANAGING CORPORATE WEALTH: THE OPERATIONS OF A COMPREHENSIVE
FINANCIAL GOALS SYSTEM 17-34 (1984).
Professors Fama and Jensen offer a broader view of the firm. From their perspective, the firm is a
set of interconnected contracts among various factor-input suppliers and product/service-output demanders.
Thus, the owners (stockholders) and creditors (bondholders) are not the only claim holders besides managers;
customers, suppliers, employees, the community where the firm is located, and other related groups all have
a stake in the firm. The traditional emphasis of financial economics has been on the view of the firm as
a contractual coalition of investor stakeholders. See generally Eugene F. Fama & Michael C. Jensen,
Separation of Ownership and Control, 26 J. L. & ECON. 301 (1983); Eugene F. Fama & Michael C. Jensen,
Agency Problems and Residual Claims, 26 J. L. & ECON. 327 (1983); Eugene F. Fama & Michael C. Jensen,
Organizational Forms and Investment Decisions, 14 J. FIN. ECoN. 101 (1985). A discussion of non-investor
stakeholders is beyond the scope of our enquiry. For an excellent economic analysis, see Bradford Comell
& Alan C. Shapiro, Corporate Stakeholders and Corporate Finance, 16 FIN. MGMT. 5 (1987).
16. For an excellent description of the shareholder-manager's principal-agent problem, see Kenneth
J. Arrow, The Economics of Agency, in PRINCIPALS AND AGENTS: THE STRUCTURE OF BUSINESS 37-51
(John W. Pratt & Richard J. Zeckhauser eds., 1985). Arguably, the consumers could discipline the regulator
if prices increased by controlling their own demand for goods and services. Theoretically this is true, but
there is little empirical evidence to suggest that this control is exercised. This is potentially a rich area for
study. For a brief review of the evidence, see SANFORD V. BERG & JOHN TSCHIRHART, NATURAL MONOPO-
LY REGULATION: PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE 316-20 (1988).
17. Professors Sanjai Bhagat and Peter A. Frost surmise that managers may benefit from: (1) under-the-
table payments from investment bankers, (2) increased compensation if it is tied to accounting profits, and
(3) less variation in costs. Sanjai Bhagat & Peter A. Frost, Issuing Costs to Existing Shareholders in
Competitive and Negotiated Underwritten Public Utility Equity Offerings, 15 J. FIN. ECON. 233, 254-55
(1986) [hereinafter Bhagat & Frost].
A side-payment occurs when the underwriter of Firm A offers managers of Firm A shares of Firm B,
which is also controlled by the underwriter. A carefully structured side-payment is nearly impossible to
detect. Both regulated and unregulated companies may have their managers subverted by side-payments.
See Sanjai Bhagat, The Effect of Management's Choice between Negotiated and Competitive Equity Offerings
on Shareholder Wealth, 21 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 181, 184-85 (1986) [hereinafter Bhagat](cit-
ing examples from Clifford W. Smith, Jr., Alternative Methods for Raising Capital: Rights Versus Underwrit-
ten Offers, 5 J. FIN. ECON. 273, 292 (1977)).
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direct costs of underwriting commission paid to the investment banker, out-of-
pocket expense for filing fees and sundry expenses, and the indirect cost of
underpricing of the new shares of stock. From the shareholders' viewpoint, the
direct costs are easier to monitor. Empirical evidence 8 shows that when any
publicly-traded company issues new shares, the shares tend to be
underpriced. 9 The repeated empirical finding of such underpricing has
spawned several competing and complementary explanations for the
phenomenon.2" The more compelling explanation suggests that managers
possess superior information and investors anticipate this information
discrepancy. Managers are the "insiders," and as "insiders" they know the
"true" value of the firm. They typically issue new equity shares when they
consider the firm to be overvalued by the market.2' Aware of this tendency,
prospective shareholders commonly react negatively to the issue and bid a price
lower than the current market price. 2 This lower price is deleterious for
current shareholders who desire the highest price possible for the new shares.
The use of negotiated underwriting contracts is one means to reduce
underpricing. An investment banker, especially one who is well-established and
has a solid reputation to protect, can serve as a credible authority to certify that
an equity issue is correctly priced. Negotiations with a company's managers
permit the investment banker to gather insider information without too much
18. Smith, supra note 17.
19. The literature on efficient markets posits that the current market price is the best estimate of the
equilibrium price of a security. See, e.g., Eugene F. Fama, Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory
and Empirical Work, 25 J. FIN. 383 (1970). Hence, if the issue is sold at less than the latest market price,
it is defined as underpriced. For example, if the last market price of LILCO was $19 per share of common
stock and the new common stock was issued at $17 per share, then the stock was undervalued by 11.76%
and the new shareholders benefitted by $2 per share.
Underpricing of new security issues has several effects. First, the investment banker bears less risk
of failure of the issue because it can be sold easily and quickly. Second, the manager enjoys the successful
sale of the issue and the use of its proceeds quickly. Third, the new shareholders benefit because they buy
a security below the market value. Finally, the current shareholders lose because they sell a security for
less than the market vale.
20. Most of these explanations center upon the informational asymmetry between managers and
investment bankers or investors. Beyond the certification hypothesis, Professor David P. Baron and
Professor Kevin Rock offer two widely-cited explanations. David P. Baron, A Model of the Demand for
Investment Banking Advising and Distribution Services for New Issues, 37 J. FIN. 955 (1982); Kevin Rock,
Why New Issues are Underpriced, 15 J. FN. ECON. 187 (1986). Professor Baron contends that underpricing
occurs because of the asymmetry of information between investment bankers and managers. The investment
banker is better informed about market conditions than the managers. Hence, underpricing is an additional
compensation for the investment banker for selling the issue in an uncertain market. Professor Rock, on
the other hand, contends that underpricing occurs because of the asymmetry of information between
managers and investors. The managers are better informed about the fiscal health of the firm and the
economic worth of its projects than are the investors. Hence, underpricing is an inducement for the
uninformed investors to participate in the new issue.
21. Stewart C. Myers & Nicholas S. Majluf, Corporate Financing and Investment Decisions When
Firms Have Information that Investors Do Not Have, 13 J. FIN. ECON. 187, 188 (1984).
22. Clifford W. Smith, Jr., Investment Banking and the Capital Acquisition Process, 15 1. FIN. ECON.
3, 21 (1986).
23. James R. Booth & Richard L. Smith, Capital Raising, Underwriting and the Certification
Hypothesis, 15 J. FIN. ECON. 261, 264 (1986).
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extra effort or analysis. This additional low-cost information permits the
investment banker to gauge efficiently the "true" value of the company. While
accepting the underwriting contract, the investment banker sets the price of new
shares only slightly lower to "prove" to future shareholders that the asking price
is correct. In the absence of such an implied certification, the bid price for
newly issued shares would be much lower.
The above analysis of negotiated contracts implies that, by contrast,
investment bankers selected through a competitive bid process do not have
access to the insider information deemed necessary for the certification of the
price of new shares. Under this analysis, competitive bidding procedures would
be employed by managers only when they faced a reduced need for
certification.
Regulated utilities may have less need for certification from investment
bankers. A diligent PUC and/or SEC should help persuade future shareholders
that new shares are correctly priced. Thus, regulation should help mitigate the
effect of informational problems between managers and shareholders, and
between current shareholders and future shareholders. Extensive research on
the value of competitive bidding for providing investment banking services
indicates that competitive bidding is less expensive than negotiated bidding.'
This literature does not address, however, how the requirement of competi-
tive bidding interacts with the intensity of regulation imposed by state PUCs.
State PUCs have general oversight and rate-setting responsibility 'regarding
utilities, whereas the SEC has specific responsibility for regulating the issuance
of securities. Regulators must regulate in the public interest and be fair25 to
parties directly and immediately affected. These two regulatory agencies try to
be fair and maintain a balance, but they do so among different groups: the state
PUCs try to be fair to consumers and investor-owners, whereas the SEC tries
to be fair to current and future investor-owners vis-A-vis utility managers. This
Article analyzes the effect of state and federal regulation on utilities'
underwriting costs in an attempt to assess the usefulness of having two agencies
24. See, e.g., Bhagat & Frost, supra note 17; Dennis E. Logue & Robert A. Jarrow, Negotiated vs.
Competitive Bidding in the Sale of Securities by Public Utilities, 7 FIN. MGMT. 1 (1978); Frank J. Fabozzi
& Richard R. West, Negotiated versus Competitive Underwritings of Public Utility Bonds: Just One More
Time, 16 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 323 (1981).
25. In economics, the word "fair" has two distinct interpretations. The first interpretation concerns
the allocation of resources, whereas the second concerns the distribution of resources. According to the
most commonplace use of the term under the first interpretation, a price is fair if it reflects competitive
market conditions. This fair price is the allocatively efficient price determined in a value-neutral and
impersonal market. The payment by different segments of society of different prices for a particular good,
depending on each particular segment's ability to pay, is an example of distributive efficiency or fairness,
the second interpretation of fair. There is a basic conflict between the allocative efficiency of the market
and the distribution of resources in society. The interpretations of allocatively fair and distributively fair
are used to advance certain views about the proper role of a government. See generally EDWARD E. ZAJAC,
FAIRNESS OR EFFICIENCY: AN INTRODUCTION TO PUBLIC UTILITY PRICING (1978).
Courts often use the word fair in discussing rates of return for utilities or utility prices. In this context
the courts are more likely to use the term in the context of its efficiency interpretation.
24
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regulating security issuance in the utility industry.
The relationship between federal and state regulators is complicated by the
differing degrees of regulation imposed by PUCs on utilities operating in their
states. State PUCs, required by the law to balance the interests of both
investors2 1 and rate-payers, strike the balance for different states at different
points on the regulatory spectrum. Some PUCs have established regulatory
regimes more favorable to investors, while others have established regulatory
regimes more favorable to rate-payers." The balance struck between
competing interests is known as the regulatory climate.
This Article examines the relationship between the competitive bid require-
ment for new equity shares issued by public utilities and the regulatory climate
established by the state PUCs. Using regression analysis, this Article studies
the effect of state regulatory climates on the cost of issuing new equity shares.
The sample used in this economic analysis includes both negotiated and com-
petitively bid underwriting contracts.
The analysis shows that, for the negotiated sample, the state regulatory
climate is related to the total flotation cost and its components in unexpected
ways. Although the regulatory climate has no effect on the underpricing of the
issue, the total underwriting cost (which includes underpricing), as well as out-
of-pocket expense and underwriting commissions, are inversely related to the
favorableness of the regulatory climate for investors. Issuance of securities
through negotiated underwriting contracts becomes more expensive as the
regulatory climate becomes less favorable to investors. The Article attributes
this result to the cost of increased regulatory burdens: the larger the regulatory
burdens placed upon a utility's financial affairs by a PUC, the more expense
will be required to bring a security issue to the capital market and to pay higher
underwriting commissions.
Additionally, the analysis shows that, for the competitive bid sample, the
state regulatory climate is inversely related to the underpricing of the issue.
Underpricing increases as the regulatory climate becomes more favorable to
investors. This means that the underpricing of the issue is highest, implying a
loss for current shareholders, when the regulatory climate is most favorable to
them. Conversely, the underpricing of the issue is lowest, implying a gain for
current shareholders, when the regulatory climate is least favorable to them.
The Article attributes this result to the certification hypothesis. In an unfavor-
able regulatory climate for shareholders, the investment banker feels less need
to assure future shareholders that equity shares are correctly priced, and
26. Whether an investor lives in the state where the utility operates is irrelevant; the investor still wants
a rate of return on an investment commensurate with its risk.
27. The regulatory process has an effect on rate-payers, current and future shareholders, managers,
regulators, investment bankers, and others. As a result, gains or losses from the regulatory process are
difficult to determine. A direct trade-off between the interests of investors and those of ratepayers is
therefore difficult to detect.
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consequently, perceives less need for underpricing. This result is good for the
investment banker, who will generally find that the competitive bidding
environment is not amenable to practices that help the negotiated bidder ensure
a correct price, such as the acquisition of insider information.
The contrasting results in the analysis from the competitively bid and
negotiated equity issues indicate the lack of uniformity in both the federal and
state regulatory processes. Stated legislative intent for both PUHCA and the
SEC, and for state enabling acts and PUCs shed little light on the perverse
economic effects of overlapping regulation. Current shareholders and rate-payers
are the presumed beneficiaries under the common law of regulation, but these
groups do not in fact benefit economically.
Current economic conditions, sophisticated market participants, and general-
ly apathetic consumers require that regulatory powers be distributed so that
regulation is both economically neutral and protective of the average consumer
and average investor. In order to achieve these goals, this Article recommends
that the SEC become the sole regulator of public utility securities issuances,
replacing PUCs at the state level. Diligent and well-coordinated securities
regulation by the SEC can supplement the work of investment bankers and
ensure the success of new securities issues. By requiring greater disclosure,
increased auditing, and a host of other procedures, the SEC can help investment
bankers persuade future shareholders that new shares are correctly priced. The
careful framing and competent enforcement of regulation can facilitate commu-
nication between management and shareholders and eliminate many negative
incentives that currently encourage poor managerial decisions. The SEC is best
qualified to perform these functions.
This Article further recommends that state PUCs be restricted to regulation
of utilities' operations, rate structures, service and safety matters, and
managerial competence. Reducing the role of PUCs may alleviate the effects
of compromised commission independence which may result from the
politicization of commission selection and the influence of special interest
groups. In addition, the elimination of multiple jurisdictions would save
duplicative administrative costs.
Part I of this Article explains the purpose of PUHCA and the competitive
bid requirement imposed on utility holding companies and their subsidiaries.
Part II explains the purpose of state PUCs and describes the regulatory climate
fostered by them. Part III briefly sets forth the arguments of legal theorists on
the economic analysis of regulation. Part IV presents a regression model
analyzing the relationship between the costs of securities issuance and the
stringency of state regulatory climates. The Article concludes with recommenda-
tions for remedying the problems caused by overlapping SEC and PUCjurisdic-
tions.
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I. PUHCA and the Role of the SEC
During the Great Depression, Congress began to regulate certain financial
practices. Congress enacted both the Securities Act of 193328 and the Securi-
ties Exchange Act of 19349 to deal with -the problems of fraud and
concealment of material information in the securities industry. In addition, by
enacting PUHCA in 1935, Congress granted the SEC authority over the
financial structure and behavior of public utility holding companies.3" The twin
legislative purposes of PUHCA were to correct multiple abuses in the financing
and operation of public utility holding companies, 31 and to fill the gap in
regulatory oversight that arose from the inability of state PUCs to coordinate
their interstate activities. 32 Many of the rampant abuses3 3 and problems of
holding companies revealed during a Federal Trade Commission
investigation3' were listed in the Act.3 5 The Supreme Court has gone further
to note that the purpose of PUHCA was to protect consumer interests through
the elimination of restraints on free and independent competition.
36
PUHCA especially condemned the lack of arm's-length transactions between
operating companies and holding companies.37 Securities transactions in
particular were not done in a manner benefiting consumers or investors. As part
of the pyramiding process, securities of operating companies were exchanged
28. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1988).
29. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 404, Title 1, § 1, 48 Stat. 881 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
30. 15 U.S.C. §§ 79-79z-6 (1988).
31. SEC v. Associated Gas & Elec. Co., 24 F. Supp. 899 (S.D.N.Y.), afftd, 99 F.2d 795 (2d Cir.
1938)(PUCA is intended to protect public from abuses of capital structure decisions when public money
is sought).
Pyramiding of investment and control, excessive management and service fees, and little investor
control over management were endemic to holding companies during the 1920s and 1930s. During the
market crash of 1929, investors lost millions of dollars, and companies with investments totalling a par value
of $1.7 billion went into bankruptcy or receiverships. See CHARLES F. PHILLIPS, THE REGULATION OF
PUBLIC UTILITIES: THEORY AND PRACTICE 229 (2d ed. 1988); Comment, Federal Regulation of Holding
Companies: The Public Utility Act of 1935, 45 YALE L. J. 468, 474-8 (1936)(providing a description of
financial abuses).
32. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 621, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 4, 57 (1935); Gulf States Util. Co. v. Federal
Power Comm'n, 411 U.S. 747 (1973).
33. These abuses included the provision of inadequate information for shareholders, the issuance of
securities without the permission of the operating company's public utility commission, the issuance of
securities without any relationship between funds raised and physical assets bought, the issuance of securities
based on paper profits from intercompany transfers, the issuance of securities in anticipation of excessive
revenues from operating companies, and over-capitalization of the operating companies. 15 U.S.C. §
79a(b)(l) (1988).
34. FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, UTILITY CORPORATIONS, S. Doc. No. 92, 70th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1934).
35. 15 U.S.C. § 79a(b) (1988).
36. SEC v. New England Elec. Sys., 390 U.S. 207, 210 (1968). The Court meant to protect the
interests of the average investor in this case rather than the interests of a general consumer of utility services.
This Article refers to ratepayers as consumers, and shareholders and potential shareholders as investors or
owners.
37. Id. at 210.
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for securities of holding companies. Furthermore, additional securities were
issued by holding companies taking advantage of the pre-Depression speculation
fervor. A Senate Report stated that, "investment bankers not only furnished
financial aid when requested by holding companies, but solicited it and came
to depend upon holding companies for business. ' '38 This cozy relationship
between utility management and investment bankers provided opportunities for
self-dealing and side-payments to the detriment of shareholders and
consumers.
39
A. A History of the Competitive Bid Requirement under PUHCA
Section 6 of PUHCA grants the SEC authority over securities issuances."°
Rule 50 under PUHCA was promulgated by the SEC in 1941 to require utilities
to obtain bids for the underwriting of new securities contracts.4 The rule was
intended to assure that utilities did not divert funds from firms to underwriters
through overpriced underwriting contracts. 41 Until 1974, the SEC enforced the
rule, granting exemptions on a case-by-case basis. For example, the SEC has
exempted issues when they received favorable tax treatment ultimately
benefiting the utility customers. 43 Further, the SEC has exempted relatively
large issues because of the needs of the utility, the size and composition of the
underwriting group, and the marketing effort required for selling the issue in
the capital market."
Faced with inflation and an energy shortage in the mid-1970s, the SEC in
1974 promulgated a temporary stay of Rule 50.45 The SEC realized that
utilities were having difficulty finding investment bankers to underwrite their
equity offerings,46 and suspended the requirement that utilities obtain at least
two competitively bid offers to underwrite. The suspension lasted for about nine
and a half months.4 7 This temporary stay of Rule 50 provides valuable
information about its relative benefits.
38. S. REP. No. 621, supra note 32, at 56-57.
39. It is interesting to note that the public utility holding companies were engaged in a variety of
enterprises, such as coal mining, textiles, and taxicabs. See 10 SEC ANN. REP. 84-85 (1945).
40. 15 U.S.C. § 79f (1988).
41. 17 C.F.R. § 250.50 (1992).
42. Rule 50 requires that the utility must, at least six days prior to the awarding of the contract, publicly
invite sealed written proposals for the issuance of the utility's securities. 17 C.F.R. § 250.50(b)(1) (1992).
43. Central and South West Corp., Public Utility Holding Company Act Release No. 22750, 1982 SEC
LEXIS 260 (Dec. 2, 1982).
44. The Southern Company, Public Utility Holding Company Act Release No. 18567, 1974 SEC LEXIS
2654 (Sept. 16, 1974).
45. Temporary Suspension of the Competitive Bidding Requirements of Rule 50, Public Utility Holding
Company Act Release No. 18646, 1974 SEC LEXIS 2356 (Nov. 7, 1974).
46. See Bhagat, supra note 17, at 182-83.
47. Id.
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B. The Effects of the Competitive Bid Requirement
Evidence from the field of financial economics suggests that Rule 50 had
a beneficial market-based effect for shareholders of utilities. Professor Bhagat's
empirical study 8 shows that shareholders of utilities experienced an abnormal
negative return on the date of announcement of suspension of the rule. These
shareholders also experienced an abnormal positive return on the date of
announcement of termination of the suspension. In other words, the market
reacted negatively to the announcement of the suspension of Rule 50. Con-
versely, when the rule's suspension was terminated, the market reacted
positively.49 These results are considered consistent with the joint hypothesis
of Professor Bhagat's study that (i) competitively bid issues are less costly than
negotiated issues, and (ii) manager-shareholder agency costs are a determinant
of the firm's choice between these two methods of raising equity capital. 0
Given this market reaction and the purposes behind the competitive bid
requirement, one may conclude that competitively bid contracts benefit current
shareholders, and perhaps, future shareholders."
II. State Regulation and the Role of the PUCs
In 1877, the Supreme Court held in Munn v. Illinois that neither the Fifth
nor the Fourteenth Amendment bars the government from controlling property
"clothed with [the] public interest."52 In the ensuing fifty-seven years,
considerable litigation centered on the question of whether particular businesses
were "clothed with [the] public interest" and thus subject to regulation. In
Nebbia v. New York 3 the Supreme Court put an end to this enquiry by
holding that any business can be subject to economic regulation if the public,
through its legislatures, determines that regulation is necessary.
4
As more states asserted the right to regulate and began establishing PUCs,
48. Id. at 181, 195.
49. Id. at 195.
50. Id. at 181, 195.
51. Current shareholders, other things being equal, have not paid more than necessary to the investment
banker for the issuance services. The benefits and injuries to future shareholders are not so clearly defined.
Future shareholders gain or lose depending upon whether the competitive bid requirement continues to be
enforced by the SEC and/or the PUCs. Rational expectations about the future enforcement of the
competitive bid requirement would then be reflected in the price they would be willing to pay for new
shares.
52. 94 U.S. 113, 126. The major problem of applying the standard set in Munn is the extreme difficulty
of determining actual public interest. See, e.g., CHARLES L. SCHULTZE, THE PUBLIC USE OF PRIVATE
INTEREST (1977).
53. 291 U.S. 502 (1934).
54. Id. at 531.
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the legal basis of attacking state regulation shifted. 5 The question became not
whether a state could regulate private property, but how it could do so. The
Supreme Court's overriding concern has been the fair treatment of affected
parties when the public interest is at stake.56
A. Rate Setting
Although each state has independent enabling legislation permitting its state
PUC to set utility consumer rates, Supreme Court decisions have established
the parameters for rate regulation. The Supreme Court has granted states broad
authority to regulate but has restricted their ability to set prices. In Bluefield
Waterworks & Improvement Co. v. Public Service Comm'n,57 the Court held
that rates could not be set so low as to result in a taking of the utility's proper-
ty.
In Federal Power Comm'n v. Hope Natural Gas Co.,58 the Supreme Court
focused on the two standards of reasonableness discussed in Bluefield. First,
the Hope Court determined that a utility should earn a rate of return "commen-
surate with returns on investments in other enterprises having corresponding
risks."59 This is known as the "comparable earnings" standard. Second, the
Hope Court stated that the rate of return should be sufficient to permit the
utility to "maintain its credit and to attract capital."6 This is known as the
"capital attraction" standard.
A PUC cannot actually set the proper rate of return on a utility's securities
because only the market can accomplish that task.6' Rather, the PUC sets the
return that will be paid by ratepayers to the owners of the utility for their
investment in the utility plant. The two standards together require regulators
to ensure that the utility has an opportunity to earn a normal economic
retun.62 Using the comparable earnings standard, the regulator studies
55. Compare Cedar Rapids Gas Light Co. v. City of Cedar Rapids, 223 U.S. 655,669-90 (1912)(consid-
ering application of the Fourteenth Amendment to public utility rate regulation) with Federal Power Comm'n
v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591 (1944)(considering return to equity owner and financial integrity
of enterprise).
56. See Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 U.S. 747 (1968)(regulatory commission obligated "to
assess the requirements of the broad public interests entrusted to its protection").
57. 262 U.S. 679 (1923).
58. 320 U.S. 591 (1944).
59. Id. at 603.
60. Id.
61. In a competitive market, the equilibrium price is the price at which the quantity supplied is equal
to the quantity demanded. This is-the point of intersection of the supply and demand curves. Thus, the
price derived is the fair price for the good, which in turn leads -to allocational efficiency. Rules or
regulations interfering with the workings of the competitive market impose losses on society in the form
of excess demand or excess supply. See, e.g., JACK HIRSHLEIFER, PRICE THEORY AND APPLICATIONS 321-
29 (2d ed. 1980).
62. A normal economic return is the return necessary to attract investors and to keep the firm in
operation. M.I.T. DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS 358 (David W. Pearce ed., 1986).
30
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similarly situated companies and uses returns actually earned by these
companies as a benchmark.6 3 Under the capital attraction standard, the
regulator examines the utility's stock performance to determine whether the
utility has the ability to raise appropriate amounts of money in capital
markets.'
The Court's decisions have allowed state PUCs significant judicial leeway
in determining the appropriate rate of return for public utilities. As envisioned
by the Hope Court, rate base valuation and rate setting must be just and
reasonable in order to satisfy the Fourteenth Amendment. The Hope Court
considered the just and reasonable test as "a balancing of the investor and the
consumer interests."65 The Court however, did not adopt a particular rule for
the determination of rates. In practice, the just and reasonable standard means
that the net operating income of a utility is such that the broad public interest
is protected while at the same time the owners receive a fair and comparable
rate of return on their investment. These Hope standards were reaffirmed in the
Permian Basin Area Rate Cases.66
B. The Regulation of Security Issuance and the Competitive Bid Requirement
The primary role of the state PUC is to set the rate of return on a utility's
capital. The opinions of the Supreme Court have, however, led PUCs to adopt
policies which restrict the freedom of utilities to make capital budgeting and
financing decisions, and subject these decisions to review. If regulatory com-
missions or other governmental agencies discover that a utility has incurred
unnecessary costs, these costs are not charged to the consumers but are charged
against owners' equity. Security issuance transactions are one of the three
practices commonly reviewed by regulatory agencies.67 States can require
public utilities to obtain permission to issue securities from the state PUC since
the utility's cost of capital is fundamentally related to the rate of return to
63. Andrei Schleifer, A Theory of Yardstick Competition, 16 RAND J. ECON. 319, 319-20 (1985).
64. See KEITH M. HOWE & EUGENE F. RASMUSSEN, PUBLIC UTILITY ECONOMICS AND FINANCE 99
(1982).
65. 320 U.S. at 603.
66. 390 U.S. 747 (1968). See also South La. Area Rate Cases v. Federal Power Comm'n, 428 F.2d
407 (5th Cir. 1970); Placid Oil Co. v. Federal Power Comm'n, 483 F.2d 880 (5th Cir. 1973); Mobil Oil
Corp. v. Federal Power Comm'n, 417 U.S. 283 (1974).
The U.S. Supreme Court has not modified, extended, or limited its opinion since Permian Basin Area
Rate Cases so as to affect the enquiry of this Article. We cite Permian Basin in order to illuminate Hope,
and not for the proposition for which it is ordinarily or usually cited (that the regulator has the authority
to make the regulatory process itself simpler in the public interest). It is Hope that provides a basis for the
analysis in this Article and not Permian Basin.
67. The other two practices are the use of eminent domain powers and the procurement of certificates
of convenience and necessity. For a listing of the various state powers over securities issues, see NATIONAL
AsS'N OF REGULATORY UTILITY COMMISSIONERS, 1987 ANNUAL REPORT 499-500 (1988) [hereinafter
NARUCI.
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investors.68
Thirty-eight states and the District of Columbia have authorized PUCs to
require competitive bids for utilities' flotation of common stock.6 9 Twelve
state PUCs currently exercise their vested authority to require competitive
bidding for underwriting new common stock.7" Even in these twelve states,
the state PUCs have the authority to grant an exemption from the requirement
that underwriting contracts be competitively bid.7
C. The Regulatory Climate Fostered by the PUCs
A state's utility regulatory climate provides information about the PUC's
vision of the trade-offs that exist between the interests of consumers and
investors. While a state's regulatory environment is not directly observable,
Wall Street firms rate state regulatory environments according to investment
potential. Generally, the rating firm checks for the presence or absence of
certain policies to judge the state's regulatory climate. 72 For example, some
states prohibit a utility from including plant-under-construction in the rate
base.73 This policy causes the utility to carry a large amount of invested
capital which does not earn any return. If the utility were allowed a return on
plant-under-construction, the shareholders would benefit. Therefore, states
allowing a return on construction work-in-progress (CWIP) have a regulatory
climate more favorable to investors. Similarly, states that do not require utilities
receiving income tax refunds to lower rates by the amount of the refund also
have a more favorable regulatory climate. The utility can return the income tax
68. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 46-2-28 (Supp. 1991); CAL. PUB. UTIL. § 822 (West Supp. 1992); FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 366.04 (West Supp. 1991); N.Y. PUB. SERV. L. § 69 (McKinney 1989); N.M. STAT. ANN.
§ 62-6-6 (Michie Supp. 1992).
69. NATIONAL Ass'N OF REGULATORY UTILITY COMMISSIONERS, 1990 ANNUAL REPORT 537 (1991).
70. Id. at 539.
71. The California PUC's presumption is in favor of competitive bidding, but it recognizes that this
presumption cannot be a hard and fast rule in view of ever-changing conditions of the market. General
Telephone of California, Decision No. 8605070, 1986 Cal. PUC LEXIS 343, at *5 (May 28, 1986). A
limited sample of the California PUC orders shows that the PUC exempts utilities if their California
operations are small. Washington Water Power Co., Decision No. 92-05-062, 1992 Cal. PUC LEXIS 433,
at *4 (May 20, 1992). The PUC also exempts utilities if financial markets are volatile, if the issue is a
private placement, or if the utility desires to issue in an overseas market where all underwriting agreements
are negotiated. General Telephone of California, at *4.
The Florida PUC, on the other hand, takes a different approach. Generally it allows utilities to use
any means reasonably necessary to issue securities. See, eg., Florida Power Corp., 91-12 F.P.S.C. 159
(1991). While the Florida PUC has the authority to regulate securities issuances, FLA. STAT. ANN. § 366.04
(West Supp. 1991), it allows utilities to employ either competitive or negotiated contracts. See, e.g., Tampa
Elec. Co., 90-10 F.P.S.C. 383 (1990); Florida Power & Light Co., 90-11 F.P.S.C. 257 (1990). Note that
the Florida PUC, nevertheless, requires an accounting of underwriting and other fees to determine their
reasonableness. FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 25-8.009 (1992).
72. See, e.g., Jeffrey A. Dubin & Peter Navarro, Regulatory Climate and the Cost of Capital, in
REGULATORY REFORM AND PUBLIC UTILITIES 141 (Michael A. Crew ed., 1982) (examining rating rules
of rating agencies).
73. See NARUC, supra note 67.
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refund to the shareholders or use it to their benefit. In addition, the rating
agency examines the commission's allowed return on equity. The greater the
allowed return, the greater the shareholders' benefit.74 By examining such state
policies, the rating firm determines, in part, the balance struck by each state
between consumers and owners.
Those state PUCs which have struck the balance more in favor of investors
are designated, for the purposes of this Article, as states with favorable regula-
tory climates. Those state PUCs which have implemented policies more favor-
able to consumers are designated, for the purposes of this Article, as states with
unfavorable regulatory climates.75
III. Economic Theories of Regulation
State governments regulate public utilities through public utility commis-
sions because utilities are considered natural monopolies. Under the theory of
natural monopoly, a firm with natural monopoly characteristics can serve a
market at a lower total cost than can several competing firms.7 6 In order to
maximize societal welfare through economic efficiency, the government restricts
entry into the market for supply of power, gas, water, and communication
services.77 In exchange for the market protection accorded by the state to the
74. See Peter Navarro, How Wall Street Ranks the Public Utility Commissions, 6 FIN. ANALYSTS J.
46 (1983) (arguing that rankings are significantly related only to allowed rates of return on equity and the
use of CWIP).
75. Note that both kinds of states may pass the "just and reasonable test" of Bluefield, 262 U.S. at 679
(1923) and Hope, 320 U.S. at 591 (1944).
Furthermore, one can argue that the regulatory climate variable is not necessarily a true measure of
the states' regulatory climates. It is implicitly assumed that a good rating means that a state's environment
is conducive to utility investments. Similarly, it is assumed that if a state has an unfavorable rating, that
state is not as suitable for utility investments as a state with a favorable rating. All the same, there is some
tentative evidence that a favorable utility environment is beneficial for consumers, too. See Kenneth W.
Costello, Electing Regulators: The Case of Public Utility Commissioners, 2 YALE J. ON REG. 83 (1984).
This may imply that the rating scheme does not necessarily measure the trade-off between consumers and
investors. A state with unfavorable regulatory policies, in fact, may simply be a state with poor regulatory
judgment: both consumers and investors are made worse off.
76. Natural monopolies are characterized by decreasing marginal costs; this allows one firm serving
the market to produce at a cost lower than if competition were present. The lower costs result from the
ability to sell to the entire market which allows the firm to take advantage of scale economies. For a more
thorough treatment of natural monopolies, see WILLIAM W. SHARKEY, THE THEORY OF NATURAL
MONOPOLY (1982). One should note that natural monopolies are not immune from entry, and therefore
the government generally protects them against entry to obtain increased economies of scale. This protection
reduces both duplication of facilities and social costs. For example, prior to the regulation of the local
telephone exchange, there were numerous telephone companies serving individual towns. This meant that
separate telephone poles were erected for each company, carrying cables throughout the town. By allowing
only one firm to provide the service, the number of telephone poles was reduced, saving trees and improving
the appearance of the town. Thus, social costs were said to be reduced.
77. Note that some natural monopolies may be immune from entry and need not be regulated in the
same manner. Such firms are called sustainable natural monopolies. See SHARKEY, supra note 76; BERG
& TSCHIRHART, supra note 16.
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utility, the government restricts the rates these utilities can charge to consumers
of their services. 7 Government regulates to minimize market imperfections
79
and enhance the public interest."0 However, there are inherent agency costs
in the relationship between the state PUCs and society. State PUCs are
incapable, in practice, of regulating to maximize society's benefit. This failure
is explained by the "interest group theory" and the "capture theory."
The interest group theory reasons that certain interest groups control objec-
tives of a regulatory agency.8 The theory explains interest group manipulation
of regulation. While state PUCs wield much regulatory power, they are often
considered inherently political bodies and as a result are vulnerable to the
machinations of interest groups. Interest groups can manipulate the PUCs and
even "capture" the agencies in order to use governmental powers to advance
specific goals. Additionally, PUCs are subject to influence by elected politicians
who control appointments to the conmissions.
In response to demands from certain interest groups, 2 government imposes
regulation. 3 The interest groups may be the consumers,8 non-regulated firms
78. See Munn, 94 U.S. at 133 (1877)(pernitting a state to regulate a grain warehouse monopoly because
the property was "clothed with a public in.terest"). See also Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 534
(1934)(lf a property owner "embarks in a business which public interest demands shall be regulated, he
must know regulation will ensue.").
79. For a discussion, see Richard A. Posner, Theories of Economic Regulation, 5 BELL J. ECON. 335,
336 (1974).
80. See Har.ry M. Trebing, Regulation of Industry: An Institutionalist Approach, 21 J. ECON. ISSUES
1707, 1711 (1987).
Government regulation, however, may introduce costs. For example, see Harvey Averch & Leland
L. Johnson, Behavior of the Firm Under Regulatory Constraint, 52 Am. ECON. REV. 1053 (1962), who show
that rate base regulation, in which the firm is given a fixed rate of return on capital, causes the firm to
overinvest in capital relative to other inputs. This "over-capitalization" imposes a resource cost on society.
Thus, the benefits of regulation must take into account any distortions and dead-weight losses imposed by
the regulatory process.
There may also be so called "non-market failure" or "governmental failure." The government is no
more capable of "fixing" market imperfections than any other institution. Thus, intervention in the market
should be considered with care. See Charles Wolf, A Theory of Non-market Failure: Framework for
Implementation Analysis, 22 J. L. & ECON. 107 (1979).
81. WILLIAM T. GORMLEY, THE POLITICS OF PUBLIC UTILITY REGULATION 134 (1983).
82. See George J. Stigler, Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. EcoN. & MAN. ScI. 3 (1971);
Sam Peltzman, Toward a More General Theory of Regulation, 19 J. L. & ECON. 211 (1976).
83. See, e.g., Gregg A. Jarrell, The Demand for State Regulation of the Electric Utility Industry, 21
J. L. & ECON. 269 (1978). Professor Jarrell gives perhaps one of the best interpretations of the views of
Professor Stigler and Professor Peltzman by considering the regulation of electric utility rates as a means
of redistributing wealth among various interest groups. These interest groups incur an expense to "capture"
the benefit created by a governmental process. This type of "rent-seeking" behavior has been examined
from several perspectives in the social sciences. Prominent among these are the economic, sociologic, and
political science perspectives. A discussion of all the explanations of rent-seeking behavior is beyond the
scope of our enquiry. Professor Noll, however, provides an excellent review of various rent-seeking theories.
See Roger G. Noll, Government Regulatory Behavior: A Multidisciplinary Survey and Synthesis, in
REGULATORY POLICY AND THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 9 (Roger G. Noll ed., 1985).
84. But see Costello, supra note 75. Costello surveys research describing effects of electing commis-
sioners on various measures of consumer welfare and presents new research suggesting that consumers as
a class are not better off under an elected commission. By implication, interest groups other than consumers
are able to "capture" the commission for their own good.
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that desire protection against additional competition, legislators, organized labor,
or the regulated firm themselves. These groups use governmental power to
advance their own interests at the expense of other groups.8 5
The capture theory reasons that the regulated industry "captures" the regula-
tory agency and directs its regulatory functions to benefit the industry itself.8 6
The regulated industry, through the use of perquisites and influence, can
essentially direct the PUC to strike a balance between utility company investors
and consumers favorable to the investors.
Given these new perspectives on the motivations for regulation, researchers
have attempted to discover regulators' constituencies. 7 Some have suggested
that elected regulators would be more responsive to voters (consumers) than
would appointed regulators who are considered sympathetic to the regulated
industries.88 This may or may not be the case: elective offices are expensive
to acquire. The money required to finance campaigns for elective offices could
conceivably come from the regulated industry as well as the consumers. Thus,
even if regulators are elected rather than appointed, they are still likely to need
the regulated industry's support and contributions to mount a successful cam-
paign.
85. Before one passes judgment about whether it is desirable to allow interest group manipulation in
the political and regulatory process, one should review James Madison's comments set forth in THE
FEDERALIST PAPERS. See THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (James Madison). While highlighting the difference
between the political and regulatory processes, Professor Noll states:
The sensitivity of government policy in a representative democracy to pressures from interest
groups has long been recognized. James Madison in Federalist 10 understood that a key
constitutional problem was how to build a democratic government that protected individual rights
but was not controlled by special interests. Madison's solution was to construct a legislature in
which all important interests were likely to be represented but each was unlikely to have much
power. Regulatory agencies, because of their single-purpose mission and relatively small size,
do not have this Madisonian protection when undertaking their quasi-legislative functions; hence
their susceptibility to dominance by special interests.
NOLL, supra note 83, at 43-44.
86. MARVER H. BERNSTEIN, REGULATING BUSINESS BY INDEPENDENT COMMISSION (1955).
87. See Costello, supra note 75. See also William J. Boyes & John M. McDowell, The Selection of
Public Utility Commissioners: A Reexamination of the Importance of Institutional Setting, 61 PUB. CHOICE
1 (1989).
88. See Michael de Courcy Hinds, Citizen Utility Boards Hunt Industry White Elephants, N.Y. TIMES,
June 6, 1982, at E8. See also Costello supra note 75.
One of the more interesting recent studies examines the various states' approaches to long-distance
telecommunications deregulation. The study demonstrates that in states with elected commissions and large
intrastate telecommunications markets with many actors, such as California and Texas, AT&T's competitors
have been able to keep AT&T constrained. This failure to deregulate has benefited the competitors vis-a-vis
AT&T. In contrast, in states with high-intensity use of the network by businesses, there is a tendency to
deregulate the intrastate long-distance market. This occurs because in the absence of deregulation business
customers cross-subsidize residential customers and thereby pay higher prices. Thus, where business
consumers are confident lower prices will result from deregulation, deregulation is more likely to occur.
DAVID L. KASERMAN ET AL., THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF DEREGULATION: THE CASE OF INTRASTATE
LONG DISTANCE (Department of Economics, Auburn University Working Paper, 1988).
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IV. An Economic Analysis of Security Issuance by Regulated Firms
A. Economic Theory and Predictions of Interest Groups' Gain or Loss
The utility's regulatory climateinfluences which interest groups gain and
which lose as a result of the competitive bid requirement. For the sake of
clarity, we will examine two extreme regulatory climates, the most favorable
and the most unfavorable. It is assumed that the favorable climate allows
underwriting costs, either explicitly, by including the cost as a legitimate
business expense or by modifying the cost-of-capital, or implicitly, by
"grossing-up" the rate base. These regulatory postures benefit the utility's
investors.
The above scheme is used to prepare Table 1, which contains economic
predictions of the effects of the intersection of the state's regulatory climate
and the competitive bid requirement on the welfare of consumers, current and
future shareholders, bankers, and management. The table lists the gains and
losses of each interest group under four conditions: competitively bid issues
under favorable and unfavorable regulatory climates; and negotiated issues
under favorable and unfavorable regulatory climates. Recall that, empirically
competitively bid securities flotations have lower costs than negotiated flota-
tions.89 For the purpose of this. Article, the former is termed a competitive (or
economically fair) cost and the latter an uncompetitive (or economically unfair)
cost.90
Panel A in Table I shows the interaction of the competitive bid requirement
with the most favorable climate. We see that consumers are indifferent to the
cost of stock flotation if it is competitively, and thus fairly, determined. But
consumers suffer if they are asked to bear the unfair -cost resulting from
negotiated underwriting contracts. Current shareholders are indifferent to the
competitive bid requirement if the cost is included in the rate of return, which
is a characteristic of a favorable regulatory climate.91 If the cost is allowed
in the rate of return, these shareholders receive the statutory rate of return
regardless of the competitiveness of the cost.
Future shareholders or potential investors are likely to be indifferent to
competitive costs emanating from the competitive bidding process to the extent
these costs are restricted to the underwriting commission and out-of-pocket
expense. Future shareholders do benefit from underpricing, however, because
they pay a lower price for the shares. If underpricing is more likely under a
89. See Bhagat, supra note 17.
90. It is possible that these uncompetitive costs could reach the monopolistic level. If the investment
banking firm has contracted with the utility and the utility has decided not to change bankers, the investment
banker could charge the monopolistic price and the utility will just pass all the costs onto the ratepayers.
91. See discussion in Part I1, Section C.
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favorable regulatory climate because of the greater need for certification, then
we should expect future shareholders to have the greatest gain in a favorable
regulatory climate when negotiated underwriting contracts are used.
Investment bankers stand to lose under a competitive bid process regardless
of the regulatory environment because there is no opportunity to self-deal or
to obtain access to the corporate authority. In addition, investment bankers with
superior bargaining power or those who possess on-going close ties with
utilities would be unable to use these assets to obtain underwriting contracts.92
In contrast, when regulation permits negotiated contracts, investment bankers
tend to be better off because management can reward them generously, espe-
cially when managers expect to pass these extra costs to the ratepayers. The
competitive bid requirement also has a negative effect on managers, again
because business discretion is removed, and there is less opportunity for self-
dealing with investment bankers. 93
Panel B in Table I shows the interaction of the competitive bid requirement
with the most unfavorable climate. The regulatory climate is considered unfa-
vorable if the state PUC does not allow, either explicitly or implicitly, costs
of raising capital in the rate proceedings. The direction of impact on three
groups, future shareholders, investment bankers and management, is the same
as in Panel A because the method of flotation has a direct and more immediate
impact on the well-being of participants than does the regulatory regime.
The impact on the first two groups, consumers and current shareholders,
however, is quite different from that in Panel A. Under the unfavorable climate
the consumers do not bear the legitimate costs of doing business; they are
certainly better off irrespective of the economic fairness of the cost. Conversely,
current shareholders lose, whether the contract is competitively bid or negotiat-
ed, if the cost is excluded from the calculation of rates. Certainly, the benefits
to managers are likely to be greatest in a favorable regulatory climate if negoti-
92. It is interesting to hypothesize that the losses to investment banks, which stem from the competitive
bid requirement, are inversely related to their reputation and/or size. Less prestigious or smaller investment
banks are likely to be more receptive to competitive bidding because it gives them an opportunity to compete
on an equal footing with their more prestigious, larger brethren.
93. Managers can benefit in several ways. First, an investment banker can compensate a manager
through side payments that may be difficult to detect and prosecute. Second, if an investment banker is
on the board of directors or executive committee of a corporation, it is easy for a manager, and flattering
for the investment committee, to select the banker's firm to provide underwriting services. Third, if
managerial remuneration is tied to accounting profits, the manager can show higher accounting profits by
including in the underwriting fee payments for past, present, and future consulting services which are
unrelated to the current securities issue. The accounting profits would be lower if the consulting fee were
paid explicitly, and hence the manager's remuneration would be correspondingly lower. See Bhagat, supra
note 17, at 184-85.
Note that self-dealing may or may not violate the manager's duty to the firm. Managers may develop
personal relationships with investment bankers, and this relationship might benefit the firm. The manager
may in his best judgement undertake some contract which benefits the firm directly and the manager
indirectly. This contract may appear to be self-dealing, while in reality it is not. More crass arrangements,
such as kickbacks, however, would violate the manager's duty to the firm.
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ated contracts are used.
Table I depicts the impact of the competitive bid requirement on certain
groups under different regulatory climates. However, observe that the magnitude
of the benefit is indeterminate. The zero-sum game aspect of regulation seems
to disappear: no longer is one group's benefit the other group's loss, and vice-
versa.94 In the "game" of capital markets, there are numerous players whose
benefits or losses cannot be determined a priori. It is possible that the use of
regulation can lead to a net loss among these players, and as a result social
welfare would be reduced.
B. The Data
The data are taken from a sample of the utility equity offerings from
January 1973 through September 1980.95 The full sample is divided into two
sub-samples representing negotiated and competitively bid contracts. The full
sample contains 538 issues of seasoned stock of public utilities. Of these, 70
are competitively bid offerings, whereas 468 are negotiated offerings.
The favorableness of the states' regulatory environments is determined via
Duff and Phelps' ratings of the state PUCs. Each state PUC is given a rank on
a scale of one through six - one being the most favorable climate and six
being the most unfavorable. One would hypothesize that the more unfavorable
the state regulatory environment, the more the ratepayers benefit relative to the
utility investors. Under the Bluefield and Hope opinions the state must balance
these interests. Recall that the Duff and Phelps' state ratings provide some
evidence of the balance a particular state has struck between ratepayers and
investors. This balance may not be realized, however. The effects of the
competitive bid requirement must be incorporated in the analysis in order to
obtain an accurate picture of the empirical relationship between ratepayers,
investors, and other interest groups.
Using regression analysis we attempt to measure the effects of the interac-
tion between the state's regulatory environment and the competitive bid require-
ment.96 Our discussion focuses on five regression analysis variables associated
94. One could suggest that the lack of a zero-sum game arises from the interrelated layers of agency
relationships between regulators and managers, regulators and consumers, managers and shareholders, and
investment bankers and managers. Nevertheless, if the purpose of regulation is presumed to be a reduction
of the informational asymmetry and agency problems among various actors, then it is clear that regulation
has failed to meet its goal.
95. Each of these utilities is listed on a major stock exchange, and all securities in the sample have
historical data on tapes at the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) at the University of Chicago.
The data-set is the same as that of Bhagat & Frost, supra note 17, who obtained flotation cost data from
Blythe Eastman Paine Webber, Inc., and Ebasco Business Services, Inc.
96. Regression analysis, developed by Sir Francis Galton in the late 19th century, provides a basis for
predicting the value of one variable from the value of another (or others). Galton's study led to the term
"regression analysis" to describe the statistical relationship between variables.
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with each equity offering.97
(1) COMM: Underwriting commission is expressed as a percentage of the
subscription (or issue) price. This is a direct cost of flotation.
(2) EXP: Issuer expenses, other than commissions paid to the
underwriter, divided by the issue size and scaled up by a factor
of 100. These are called out-of-pocket expense of the issuance.
These are direct costs of flotation.
(3) UNDER: Underpricing is measured by a transformation of the ratio of
the last trade price to the issue price. Specifically, UNDER =
[(LTP/ISP) - 1.0] x 100, where LTP is the last trade price, and
ISP is the issue price. When UNDER is a positive number,
shares are sold at less than the market price, and hence the
current stockholders are worse off. When UNDER is a
negative number, shares are sold at more than the market price,
and hence the current stockholders are better off. This is an
indirect, implied cost of flotation.
(4) TUC: Total underwriting cost is the sum of previously defined
variables, underwriting commission (COMM), out-of-pocket
expense (EXP) and underpricing (UNDER). Thus, this is the
sum of direct and indirect costs of flotation.
The variable whose value we wish to estimate or explain is referred to as the dependent variable,
whereas the variable (or variables) whose values are used to estimate or explain is (are) referred to as the
independent or explanatory variable (or variables), or regressor(s). The most basic type of regression is
called the simple linear regression which is characterized by the use of one dependent and one independent
variable. The relationship between these two variables is called linear because it gives us the well-known
equation of the straight line: Y = A + BX, where Y is the dependent variable and X is the independent
variable. A and B are the estimated regression coefficients that represent the intercept and slope,
respeictively, of the regression line on a two-dimensional graph. The intercept term of the regression line
is interpreted as the fixed (non-dependent) effect. It can be interpreted as the mean value of the dependent
variable when the effect of the independent variables is held constant. The slope term is interpreted as the
effect of the independent variables.
The simple linear regression is a technique to find values of A and B such that the resulting line has
the "best fit" through the scatter of points comprising the actual observations of the dependent and indepen-
dent variables. By appropriate statistical tests, we can then determine how well the independent variable
explains the dependent variable. Here, we use the extended technique of multiple regression analysis, where
we use more than one independent variable to explain the dependent variable: Y = A + B, X, + B2 X2 + B3
X3. Although the presence of two or more independent variables makes the geometry of multiple regression
more complex, the process is still the same. We must find the values of A, B, B2, and B3 such that the
multidimensional figure has the "best fit" through the scatter of points. By appropriate statistical tests, once
again we can determine how well each independent variable explains the dependent variable. See generally
JOHN NETER El AL., APPLIED LINEAR STATISTICAL MODELS (3d ed. 1990).
97. Although not listed here, several other variables are used in this study as controls for other factors,
such as market-based risk, residual risk, market fluctuations, and size of issue (as a proxy for company size),
impinging on flotation costs. All variables are listed in the Appendix.
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(5) REG: Regulatory climate is an interval variable taking the value from
one (most favorable to the utility's investors or current
shareholders) to six (most unfavorable to the utility's
investors). Thus, the greater the value of regulatory climate
(REG), the more unfavorable is the state regulation for
investment in utilities.
With the above data, we tested the hypothesis, as presented in Table 1,
that the regulatory climate does not affect flotation costs regardless of whether
the contract is negotiated or competitively bid. These tests were done through
standard t-tests.
C. The Results
The results from the regression analysis are shown in Table 2. Panel A
represents the full sample; Panel B represents the competitively bid sub-sample;
and Panel C represents the negotiated sub-sample. Each panel shows five
estimated coefficients for regulatory climate (REG): Regression I uses total
underwriting cost (TUC) as the dependent variable; Regression 2 uses out-of-
pocket expense (EXP) as the dependent variable; Regression 3 uses underwrit-
ing commission (COMM) as the dependent variable; Regression 4 uses under-
pricing (UNDER) as the dependent variable; and Regression 5 uses direct cost
(EXP+COMM) as the dependent variable.
Panel A shows that REG is insignificant when TUC and COMM are the
dependent variables. It will become clear later that the insignificance of REG
when TUC is the dependent variable is due to a canceling of the opposing
effects of the two sub-samples. REG is significantly positive when EXP and
EXP+COMM are the dependent variables. This outcome implies that out-of-
pocket expense and direct expense are higher in states with less favorable
regulatory climates. This is the opposite of what one would expect because in
a more favorable regulatory climate, these costs would be passed on to the
consumer.
REG is significantly negative when UNDER is the dependent variable.
This result indicates that the less favorable the regulatory climate, the lower
the level of underpricing. This, too, is surprising because protection of current
shareholders is a characteristic of a favorable climate rather than an unfavorable
or stringent climate.
Panel B shows that REG is insignificant when EXP, COMM, and EXP+
COMM are the dependent variables. REG is significantly negative when TUC
and UNDER are the dependent variables. The results for the competitively bid
sub-sample are different than those for the full sample. For this sub-sample,
UNDER seems to be the strongest influence on the total cost function. This
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inference is drawn from the significance of the UNDER coefficient.
Panel C shows that REG is significantly positive when TUC, EXP, and
EXP+COMM are the dependent variables. It is not surprising that the results
for the negotiated sub-samples are similar to those for the full sample: the
negotiated contracts constitute the largest part of the full sample (468 of 538
issues).
D. A Discussion of the Results
The results of the regression analysis provide economic content in order
to review the predictions from the economic theory presented in Table 1. To
test these theories, two hypotheses should hold true:98 (1) the regulatory
climate has no impact on the flotation cost (of any sample), and (2) the impacts
on the competitively bid and negotiated samples are equal. The actual results,
as summarized in Table 3, are startlingly different from these hypotheses.
We analyze the results of the regression analysis using the relationships
established between the dependent and independent variables. The four depen-
dent variables - TUC, EXP, COMM, and UNDER - are examined under
both the favorable and unfavorable regulatory regimes. Table 3 depicts the
impact the regulatory climate has on the four underwriting cost variables within
the full, negotiated, and competitively bid samples. The results show that
multiple regulators affect the regulatory environment, and that this altered
regulatory environment in turn influences the cost of stock flotation. These
results lead to the conclusion that multiple regulators have an impact on the
costs of utility securities issuance.
Table 3 displays the results of the regression analysis. TUC is not affected
by the regulatory climate for the full sample. This finding is depicted in Panel
A of the table. The regression analysis determined that REG is insignificant
when TUC is the dependent variable.99 This statistically insignificant relation-
ship is represented by the word "average" in Table 3. If the variable is average
under one regulatory climate it is average under the other, because by defini-
tion, there is no significant change as we move from one climate to the next.
When the total cost is examined through the segregated samples, however,
we find that the regulatory climate becomes important. The behavior of TUC
for the competitively bid sample is intuitively pleasant: TUC decreases as REG
becomes less favorable. The regression coefficient from Table 2 is negative,
so as we move to a more favorable climate, the relationship between TUC and
REG becomes significantly negative. This is represented by the "above aver-
age" and "below average" in the table.
98. For methodological details on the hypotheses and their testing, see the Appendix.
99. See Table 2.
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The behavior for the negotiated sample, however, seems perverse, for as
the unfavorableness of the regulatory climate increases, the total underwriting
cost for the negotiated sample also increases (from below average to above
average, again because the regression coefficient is positive). A similar perverse
behavior is uncovered for EXP and COMM for the negotiated sample: under
the most unfavorable regulatory climate, the issuer's out-of-pocket expense and
underwriting commission are the highest.
Finally, UNDER shows the most unexpected behavior, although the results
are consistent with the certification hypothesis discussed earlier. For the full
sample, which is comprised mostly of negotiated contracts, the regression
coefficient is negative, implying that as the unfavorableness of the regulatory
climate increases, the underpricing of the issue decreases. Presumably, in an
unfavorable regulatory climate, investment bankers feel less need to assure the
investors that the stock issue is correctly priced, and consequently have less
need for underpricing. Surprisingly, these results are even more pronounced for
the competitive bid sample.
As discussed earlier, with competitive bidding contracts, investment
bankers have less ability to acquire the inside information needed to "certify"
the issue. This suggests that the requirement of competitive bidding in an
unfavorable regulatory climate would eliminate, from a practical standpoint, the
necessity of certification through underpricing. But the requirement of competi-
tive bidding in a favorable regulatory climate could still necessitate certification
through underpricing.
One interesting implication of the underpricing phenomenon is that current
and future shareholders are each better off in different regulatory regimes. In
states characterized by a favorable regulatory climate, the current shareholders
lose while the future shareholders gain because the future shareholders acquire
shares priced lower than the fair price (underpricing is positive). Conversely,
in states characterized by the most unfavorable regulatory climate, the current
shareholders gain while the future shareholders lose because the future share-
holders pay a price higher than the fair price for shares (underpricing is nega-
tive, or synonymously, shares are overpriced).
Table 4 compares the empirical findings on the gains and losses of various
interest groups with the predictions of economic theory. To determine the
impact on consumers, we must look at the TUC and EXP variables. When
underwriting contracts are negotiated, consumers receive greater benefits in
states with a favorable regulatory climate. When the contracts are competitively
bid, consumers benefit more from an unfavorable climate. While the latter may
be expected, the former is counter-intuitive.
The underpricing variable, UNDER, reveals shareholder preferences.
Current shareholders are better off in an unfavorable climate when the utility
chooses a negotiated contract. Nevertheless, the wealth transfer between current
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and future shareholders is not significant for negotiated contracts irrespective
of the unfavorableness of the regulatory climate. On the other hand, the wealth
transfer between the two groups of shareholders is significant for competitively
bid contracts, implying that current shareholders would not be indifferent to the
regulatory climate. If a utility chooses a competitively bid contract, then current
shareholders are in a superior position in an unfavorable climate because of
negative underpricing (or overpricing). Both results are unexpected. Future
shareholders, of course, benefit from underpricing, but because we see the
largest interaction between UNDER and REG for the competitively bid sample,
we obtain the counter-intuitive result that future shareholders receive the largest
relative gain with competitive bidding in a favorable regulatory climate.
As represented by the variable COMM, investment bankers are better off
in an unfavorable climate if the utility chooses a negotiated contract because
they will earn higher commissions. If the utility chooses competitive bidding,
though, the investment bankers are indifferent to the regulatory climate.
Finally, management, which is more concerned with EXP, is expected to
find greater benefit with negotiated contracts in a favorable regulatory climate.
Empirically, however, management appears to gain more in an unfavorable
climate for the competitive bid sample. This inference is drawn from the
positive relationship between EXP and REG.
In summary, we discovered several instances of counter-intuitive results.
Although we expected consumers to lose under a favorable regulatory climate,
we found that consumers living in states with a favorable regulatory climate
would prefer negotiated contracts, while those in an unfavorable climate would
prefer competitively bid contracts. We also thought that current shareholders
would gain under an unfavorable climate and that future shareholders would
lose under an unfavorable climate (because of a lack of underpricing). We
found both to be true. Further, we anticipated that investment bankers would
prefer negotiated contracts regardless of the regulatory climate but found that
investment bankers servicing utilities in a favorable climate would prefer
competitively bid contracts. Finally, we expected that management would gain
in a favorable regulatory climate. We found, instead, that management would
gain in an unfavorable climate.'0°
Conclusion
This Article has presented an economic analysis of the multiple jurisdic-
tions of the federal, the SEC, and state, PUCs, regulatory agencies. The SEC
100. These counter-intuitive results may be explained if REG were not a true measure of the states'
regulatory climates. See supra note 75.
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is required to protect the interests of current and future shareholders in the
nation's public utility holding companies and their subsidiaries. The state PUCs
must balance the interests of the public utility investors and the public utility
ratepayers. Both agencies are enabled by their statutes to require competitive
bids for securities flotation.
Empirical evidence shows (1) that negotiated underwriting contracts cost
more than competitively bid contracts, and (2) that investors prefer competitive-
ly bid underwriting contracts to negotiated contracts. However, this evidence
is not enough to claim that the competitive bid rule is a fair regulation in the
allocative or distributive efficiency sense because it is the net welfare effect
of the total regulatory environment that is determinative.
As demonstrated in the regression analysis, the issuance cost structure for
competitively bid contracts is quite different from that of negotiated contracts,
and the relationships between the cost structures and the regulatory climate is
often different from those predicted from economic theory. These frequently
unexpected results lead one to question the wisdom of placing any securities
issuance regulation in the hands of disparate state PUCs. Having multiple
regulatory agencies has resulted in a balancing of the interests between inves-
tors and ratepayers that is often different from the balance sought by individual
state PUCs.' 0'
This Article recommends that the SEC be given powers to require compet-
itive bids from all public utilities for flotation of their new securities. 02 Com-
petitively bid underwriting contracts result in greater economic efficiency and
should be broadly required. The present policy of granting exemptions to the
competitive bid requirement should be curtailed if not warranted by capital
market conditions. 10 3
101. The regulatory actions may create a rate structure that is unconstitutional under the Fifth or
Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. However, this line of enquiry is beyond the scope
of this Article.
102. To the extent the SEC needs exclusive authority to require the bids, PUHCA or other enabling
acts of the SEC's jurisdiction must be amended. Correspondingly, the state PUCs' enabling acts must be
modified to cede this authority to a federal regulatory body. This Article does not address possible
constitutional issues of pre-emption or supremacy.
103. The decision to enforce more strictly the competitive bidding requirement should be made by the
SEC on a case-by-case basis instead of through a narrowly focused legislative mandate. Congress should
enact legislation enlarging the SEC's jurisdiction and vesting it with wider powers. The SEC's technical
expertise in capital market regulation makes it a more competent watchdog than Congress, which lacks the
means to directly manage the securities markets.
A congressional mandate to enforce competitive bidding through the SEC will also bind that agency.
Today, changes in international politics can affect America's capital markets and economy very quickly.
Therefore, it is prudent to enable administrative agencies to react quickly to transformed world conditions.
For example, in the event of a crisis severely influencing the supply of oil and thereby causing a turmoil
in capital markets, the SEC must have the power to suspend the competitive bid rule to sustain the smooth
functioning of domestic capital markets.
In increasingly integrated international financial markets, it is imperative that regulatory agencies
such as PUCs be kept away from capital market regulations. The United States, Europe, and Japan, among
others, have already embarked upon negotiations for developing a common set of regulations for their
domestic securities markets. Securities Regulation; Capital Spat, ECONOMIST, Oct. 31, 1992, at 76.
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Competitive bidding for public utility underwriting contracts is not without
costs. This Article's regression analysis shows that under competitive bidding,
the more favorable a state regulatory climate is to investors, the greater is the
incidence of underpricing. The cause of this anomalous result is attributed to
the investment banker who does not have low-cost access to insider information
and who therefore "certifies" the public offering at a lower price. 14 A system
regulating the securities issuances of public utilities should seek to capture both
the cost advantages of competitive bidding and the certification function
performed by investment bankers.
This Article further recommends that the SEC devise an auditing proce-
dure whereby firms can either self-certify or receive certification quickly from
the SEC. Diligent regulation by the SEC can supplement and even substitute
for investment bankers. Close monitoring by the SEC would substantially
resolve the agency and information problems faced by participants in utility
flotations.
The state PUCs cannot effectively regulate securities issuances by public
utilities because they are primarily political bodies and thus are subject to
political pressure. Moreover, the PUCs may be captured by the powerful local
regulated industry or overwhelmingly influenced by active interest groups.
The SEC is in a better position than state PUCs to regulate securities
issuances by public utilities. It is in closer touch with the market, knows
investment bankers well from non-utility issuances, and understands the con-
cerns of investors. This expertise allows it to take prompt action against
recalcitrant investment bankers or management. Therefore, the SEC would be
able to make a more systematic and rational decision on the exemption applica-
tion of a utility. By vesting the SEC with sole power to permit negotiated
underwriting contracts, the SEC can more effectively oversee all aspects of
securities issuance by utilities.
Finally, exclusive jurisdiction in one regulatory agency should result in
a gain in regulatory efficiency: administrative costs and red tape should be
reduced. The state PUCs are better able to oversee other aspects of the opera-
tion of the utility industry. More importantly, however, exclusive jurisdiction
would help both the state PUCs and the SEC to attain their specific regulatory
objectives.
104. This Article's analysis has found the counter-intuitive result that both managers and current
shareholders would prefer an unfavorable regulatory climate which may be explained by principal-agent
problems. Professors Jensen and Meckling have noted that asymmetric information and moral hazard prevent
managers (insiders) from persuading shareholders (outsiders) that managers would act in the best interests
of shareholders. See Jensen & Meckling, supra.note 15, at 312-13. Thus, managers are unable to obtain



























Regression Results for Utility Equity Offerings
January 1973 through September 1980
Dependent Variable
Regn. 1 Regn. 2 Regn. 3 Regn. 4 Regn. 5
Independent
Variable TUC EXP COMM UNDER EXP+COMM
Panel A
Full Sample of 538 Issues
REG 0.0034 0.0293 0.0461 -0.0721 0.0754
(0.090) (3.888)** (1.860) (-3.554)** (2.861)**
Panel B
Competitively Bid Sample of 70 Issues
REG -0.6211 0.0242 -0.1941 -0.4514 -0.1698
(-2.442)* (0.863) (-1.251) (-3.434)** (-1.028)
Panel C
Negotiated Sample of 468 Issues
REG 0.0848 0.0288 0.0824 -0.0264 0.1111
(2.758)** (3.618)** (3.709)** (-1.488) (4.714)**
Notes: t-statistics are given in parenthesis.
* significance at 5% level.
** significance at 1% level.
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Table 3
Qualitative Impact of Regulatory Climate on Measures of
Flotation Costs for Utility Equity Offerings


















Dependent Variable: Total Underwriting Cost (TUC)
None Average Average
d Negative Above Average Below Average
Positive Below Average Above Average
Panel B
Dependent Variable: Out-of-Pocket Expense (EXP)
Positive Below Average Above Average
d None Average Average
Positive Below Average Above Average
Panel C





























Comparison of Gains and Losses to Interest Groups
Under Differing Underwriting Contracts
for Utility Equity Offerings
January 1973 through September 1980
Negotiated Contract






















Better off in unfavorable
climate-
TUC negatively related to
REG
EXP unrelated to REG










COMM unrelated to REG
Indifferent to regulatory
climate-
EXP unrelated to REG
* Contrary to the economic theory prediction presented in Table 1.
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Appendix
I. A Description of the Data
We use a sample of the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE)-listed
and American Stock Exchange (AMEX)-listed public utility equity
offerings made to the general public through underwriters during the
period Jan. 1973 - Sept. 1980.' The data-set is the same as that of Bhagat
and Frost2 who obtained flotation cost data from Blythe Eastman Paine
Webber, Inc., and Ebasco Business Services, Inc. The availability of the
data-set allowed us to compare the results of this study with those of
earlier studies. There are eleven variables associated with each offering.
3
(1) COMM: Underwriter commission is expressed as a percentage of
the subscription (or issue) price. In negotiated offerings,
this commission may include payment for the long-term
consulting advice given by the underwriter.
(2) EXP: Issuer expenses, other than commissions paid to the
underwriter, are divided by the issue size and scaled up
by a factor of 100. These out-of-pocket expenses are SEC
filing fees, listing fees for stock exchanges, state taxes,
transfer fees, printing and engraving expenses, legal fees,
accounting and auditing fees, and engineering fees. The
opportunity costs of the time spent by the management
in planning and bringing out the issue is not included.
1. Offerings made after September 1980 are excluded from the sample in order to avoid the potentially
confounding effects of shelf registration. Shelf registration is a procedure under Rule 415 of the Securities
Act, effective February 24, 1982, permitting a corporation to register an offering that the corporation expects
to sell within two years after filing a disclosure statement with the SEC. The corporation is then permitted
to sell the issue, piecemeal or whole, anytime during the subsequent two years. At these sales, the
corporation is required to file only a short disclosure statement.
Shelf registration has changed the security issuance process substantially. Rule 415 represents a
change in'regime more than just another method of issuance. Bhagat & Frost, infra note 2, chose to avoid
the influence of shelf registration by selecting a cutoff date of September 1980. Note, however, that this
period surrounds the temporary suspension and termination of the suspension of Rule 50.
2. Sanjai Bhagat & Peter A. Frost, Issuing Costs to Existing Shareholders in Competitive and
Negotiated Underwritten Public Utility Equity Offerings, 15 J. FIN. ECON. 233 (1986) [hereinafter Bhagat
& Frost].
All securities in the sample have historical data on tapes at the Center for Research in Security Prices
(CRSP) at the University of Chicago.
3. See id. for a discussion of the data-base and the relevant variables. We are interested in the effect
of REG on the measures of flotation cost. The other variables are used for control purposes in this study.
The control variables generally follow Bhagat and Frost's results, so we do not repeat their analysis here.
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(3) UNDER: Underpricing is measured by a transformation of the ratio
o'f the last trade price to the issue price. Specifically, UN-
DER = [(LTP/ISP) - 1.0] x 100, where LTP is the last
trade price, and ISP is the subscription price (or issue
price). If ISP is less than LTP then UNDER is a positive
number, implying that the current stockholders are worse
off. If ISP is greater than LTP, then UNDER is a
negative number, implying that the current stockholders
are better off.'
(4) BETA: The systematic risk of the stock is measured by beta, esti-
mated by Dimson's technique.' Returns from 6 to 105
trading days prior to the issue-date are used. Dimson's




The unsystematic or residual risk of the stock is measured
by the standard deviation of error terms from the market
model. 6 The returns used in Dimson's beta are used to
calculate this measure, and it is scaled up by a factor of
100.
The total risk of the market is measured by the standard
deviation of the market returns. The market returns from
6 to 105 trading days prior to the issue date are used.
This is scaled up by a factor of 100.
(7) AMT: The size of the issue in millions of dollars.
(8) IAMT: The reciprocal of AMT.
(9) LAMT: The logarithm of AMT.
4. See Clifford W. Smith, Alternative Methods for Raising Capital: Rights Versus Underwritten Offers,
5 J. FIN. ECON. 273, 288 (1977).
5. Elroy Dimson, Risk Measurement When Shares Are Subject to Infrequent Trading, 7 J. FIN. ECON.
197 (1979).
6. The 'market model' is a hypothetical relationship between the returns on a stock and those on a well-
diversified representative portfolio of stocks, generally a well-recognized stock-index such as S&P 500. The
relationship is stated as R, = a, + bi R., + e,, where R, denotes return on stock i for period t, R,, denotes
return on an index, a, and b are regression coefficients for stock i, and ea is the error term.
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The above three variables, AMT, IAMT, and LAMT, are used to
capture the effect of issue size. It is well known that the relationship
between flotation cost and issue size is not linear. These three variables
permit a reasonably flexible functional form, where IAMT would help in
identifying the average fixed-cost component.
(10) TUC: The total underwriting cost is the sum of previously defined
variables, COMM, EXP, and UNDER.
The original sample contained 552 issues. In order to get a homoge-
neous sample, we eliminate the issues of telephone companies, companies
which are not regulated by state agencies, and companies which are not
electric utilities. This process of elimination leaves us 538 issues of
seasoned stocks of public utilities. Of these, 70 are competitively bid
offerings whereas 468 are negotiated contracts.
We collected the information on the regulatory climates of all fifty
states and the District of Columbia for the period 1973 through 1980.
Duff and Phelps, Inc. gives each state PUC a rank on a scale of I through
6, where I is the most favorable climate and 6 is the least favorable
climate. Duff and Phelps publishes these ratings annually for private
circulation among its clients.7
This ranking is captured in the regulatory climate (REG) variable
used in the regression analysis.
(11) REG: An interval variable, proxy for the regulatory climate, taking
the value from one (most favorable) to six (most unfavor-
able to the utility).
With the above data, we test the null hypothesis that the regulatory
climate does not affect flotation costs for both competitively bid and
negotiated contracts. This hypothesis may be tested through the following
7. See generally Jeffrey A. Dubin & Peter Navarro, Regulatory Climate and Cost of Capital, in
REGULATORY REFORM AND PUBLIC UTILITIES 141 (Michael A. Crew ed., 1982)(there are over twenty firms
which rate PUCs, but differences among them are minor); Peter Navarro, How Wall Street Ranks the Public
Utility Commissions, 6 FIN. ANALYSTS J. 46, 46-7 (1983)(dominant criteria used by these rating firms are
(1) allowed rate of return, (2) average regulatory lag, (3) whether historical or future test year is used, (4)
whether construction work-in-progress is allowed in rate base, (5) whether allowance for funds used during
construction is computed, and (6) whether automatic adjustment clause is in effect).
The most frequently used ratings are those by Duff and Phelps, Goldman Sachs, Salomon Brothers,
and Value Line. While most ratings firms do a three-point categorization of regulatory climate into average,
above average, and below average, Duff and Phelps provides a refined classification. It gives a six-point
categorization of regulatory climate for all the states going back many years. This permits a better matching
of the regulatory climate variable with the data on security issuance.
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empirical equation:
TUCi = bo + b, REGi + b2 BETAi + b3 SDERRi + b4 AMT
+ b5 IAMTi + b6 LAMT i + b 7 STDMKTi + ei,
where i represents an equity issue.
We use total underwriting cost (TUC) as the dependent variable
because it represents the total costs, direct and indirect, of issuance.
Underwriting commission (COMM) and out-of-pocket expense (EXP) are
the direct costs of floating new securities, and underpricing (UNDER) is
the indirect cost of floating new securities. The commission goes to the
underwriting syndicate, whereas the out-of-pocket expenses are incurred
for sundry items connected with the issue. Moreover, the out-of-pocket
underwriting expense has a large potential for hiding non-essential expens-
es. Depending on the subscription price set by the investment banker,
current shareholders lose if the issue is underpriced, or gain if the issue
is overpriced.
The variables measuring risk - systematic risk (BETA), unsystem-
atic risk (SDERR), market risk (STDMKT) - and the variables measur-
ing the size of the issue (and consequently the company) - AMT, IAMT,
and LAMT - are used as control variables to account for other market-
wide and company-specific influences.
We can reject the null hypothesis that the regulatory climate has no
effect on flotation costs if we can reject the null hypothesis that the
coefficient of the regulatory climate (REG) is not statistically significantly
different from zero. We can further test whether the effect is different for
the two sub-samples of competitively bid and negotiated contracts. We
are thus testing the following hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1: bi = 0 (for the full sample);
Hypothesis 2a: b, = 0 (for the competitively bid sample);
Hypothesis 2b: b, = 0 (for the negotiated sample); and
Hypothesis 3:. bI,compeiitive = blnegotiated.
Equation I is estimated for the combined sample of competitively
bid and negotiated contracts and also for the two subsamples. Aggregating
components of issuance costs into a single variable, TUC, might cause
loss of information; therefore, we also estimate the equation for different
components of TUC. We estimate the equation using EXP, COMM,
UNDER, and direct cost (EXP+COMM) in turn as the dependent vari-
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ables. Recall that the combination of EXP and COMM is defined as the
direct costs of issuance for the issuing company. UNDER cost is not used
in a two-some permutation since it is an indirect or implied cost.
Furthermore, its calculation is controversial.' The equations are estimated




The first results are from the regression estimates with TUC as the
dependent variable.' ° The results are reported in Table 1. The results
from the first regression (Regn. 1) are somewhat unexpected since
regulatory climate (REG) is insignificant. The other variables that were
used in the Bhagat and Frost study have the same sign and significance
as in that study.
When regression equations are estimated with the individual compo-
nents of the total underwriting costs - EXP, COMM, UNDER, and
EXP+COMM - as the dependent variables, a much different picture
emerges (Table 1, Regn. 2-5). When EXP and EXP+COMM are the
dependent variables, REG is positive and significantly different from zero.
This indicates that commissions and out-of-pocket expenses are higher
in states where the regulatory climate is less favorable to the investors.
This is precisely the opposite of what one would expect. Recall that these
underwriting costs can be theoretically applied to the revenue require-
ments of the public utility and are ultimately borne by the consumer.
8. See ROGER A. MORIN, UTILITIES' COST OF CAPITAL (1984). Morin defines underpricing allowance
as the sum of flotation costs, market pressure, and market break. A finance academician would prefer the
definition of underpricing as given by Bhagat and Frost, supra note 2, even though one might not agree
with them on the exact method of calculation.
9. The equations were first estimated using the ordinary least squares (OLS) method. Due to the
problems of heteroskedasticity and skewness in the residuals, we estimated the equations using the
generalized least squares (GLS) and the GLS with a Box-Cox transformation method. In the OLS estimation,
we used a White chi-square test for heteroskedasticity. See Halbert White, A Heteroskedastic-Consistent
Covariance Matrix Estimator and a Direct Test for Heteroskedasticity, 48 ECONOMETRICA 817 (1980). We
found substantial heteroskedasticity, particularly in the competitively bid sample. The chi-square statistics
for the GLS estimation indicate that heteroskedasticity is substantially reduced but not eliminated. The
skewness statistics from the GLS with Box-Cox transformation indicate that the transformation reduces the
skewness problem. The results of GLS and GLS with Box-Cox transformation are substantially the same.
We think that our results are robust. For conservation of space, only the GLS estimators are reported. The
other estimations are available from the authors.
10. The same dependent variable is used in all of the regressions of Bhagat and Frost, supra note 2.
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Permitting utilities to pass these higher costs onto consumers appears
more symptomatic of a favorable regulatory climate.
These results are in sharp contrast to the significantly negative
coefficients for REG when UNDER is the dependent variable. Thus, the
more unfavorable the regulatory climate, the less underpricing. This, too,
is somewhat surprising. Recall that the cost of underpricing is generally
borne by current shareholders of the company. When underpricing occurs,
current shareholders lose. Protection of the current shareholders is associ-
ated with a favorable regulatory climate, not with an unfavorable one.
These results lead us to reject the first null hypothesis, although not in
the manner we expected.
B. Segregated Samples
We test for the difference between the samples of competitively bid
contracts and negotiated contracts. We do a series of "t-tests' 1 of the
equality of the means of various flotation costs of the competitively bid
and negotiated issues in our sample. These results are reported in Table
2. There are substantial differences between the two samples. COMM and
TUC are significantly larger for the negotiated sample, whereas UNDER
is significantly smaller for the negotiated sample. There is no significant
difference between the two samples for EXP, but the mean of REG for
the competitively bid sample is significantly larger than that of the negoti-
ated sample.
C. Competitively Bid Sample
For the competitively bid sample, REG is significantly negative
when TUC is the dependent variable (Table 3, Regn. 1). Recall that in
the combined sample REG was insignificantly different from zero when
TUC was the dependent variable. When TUC is broken into its compo-
___-____ (n- 1) s+(n 2 -1)s
11. Specifically the t-statistic is t , where sp I + -n2- andI-- nn n +2 -2
I I1
is the pooled estimate of the common standard deviation, n, and n2 are the sample sizes, si and s are the
variances of the two samples, and i, and i are the means of the two samples. See JoHN E. FREUND, STATIS-
Tics: A FIRST COURSE 279 (3d ed. 1987).
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nent parts, EXP, COMM, UNDER, and COMM+EXP, then REG is
significantly negative only when UNDER is the dependent variable (Table
3, Regn. 2-5). Thus, for the competitively bid offerings, the underpricing
of the issue makes the largest contribution to the total underwriting cost
function so far as the regulatory climate variable is concerned.
D. Negotiated Sample
Since most of the equity offerings from the combined sample are
negotiated, it is not surprising that the results from the negotiated sample
(Table 4, Regn. 1-5) are similar to those of the full sample (Table 1).
REG is positively related to COMM, EXP, and COMM+EXP, but insig-
nificantly negatively related to UNDER. It appears that the insignificance
of REG on TUC in the full sample is due to a canceling of the opposite
effects of REG on TUC in the competitively bid and negotiated samples.
The positive effect of REG on EXP, COMM, and EXP+COMM in the
full sample is consistent with that in the negotiated sample, whereas the
negative effect of REG on UNDER in the full sample is more consistent
with that in the competitively bid sample.
E. Additional Comparisons for Segregated Samples
In addition to the simple t-tests of the different variables in the two
samples, the differences between the negotiated and competitively bid
samples can be illustrated by comparing the estimated regression coeffi-
cients, bl,competitive and bl,negotiated of REG. Many of these comparisons can
be made by inspection. For example, REG is significantly positive for the
negotiated sample but significantly negative for the competitively bid
sample when TUC is the dependent variable; it is obvious that the two
coefficients are significantly different from each other. Similarly, REG
is insignificantly negative for the competitively bid sample but significant-
ly positive for the negotiated sample when EXP is the dependent variable;
we can conclude that the two coefficients are different from each other.
Nevertheless, when, for example, REG is significantly negative for the
competitively bid sample but insignificantly negative for the negotiated
sample with UNDER as the dependent variable, it is not obvious that the
two coefficients are different from each other. In this case a t-statistic for
the equality of the two coefficients is used to test for any difference.
When all the comparisons are made either by inspection or by a t-test,
we find that the coefficients of REG are different between the competi-
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tively bid and negotiated samples in all ten cases at the two percent level
of significance. 2 These results further substantiate the acceptance of the
alternative third hypothesis.
12. The test is identical to the test in note 11.
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Appendix Table 1
Regression Results for 538 Utility Equity Offerings
January 1973 through September 1980
Regression Method: Generalized Least Squares (GLS)
Dependent Variable
Regn. I Regn. 2 Regn. 3 Regn. 4 Regn. 5
Independent
Variable TUC EXP COMM UNDER EXP+COMM
Intercept 2.015 -0.0832 1.344 0.7543 1.2609
(7.964)** (-1.634) (8.053)** (5.519)** (7.094)**
REG 0.0034 0.0293 0.0461 -0.0721 0.0754
(0.090) (3.888)** (1.860) (-3.554)** (2.861)**
BETA 0.2496 0.0287 0.0951 0.1258 0.1238
(1.850) (1.058) (1.069) (1.727) (1.307)
SDERR 1.331 0.1075 1.269 -0.0459 1.3771
(7.482)** (3.002)** (10.819)** (-0.487) (11.020)**
AMT 0.0023 0.0004 0.0013 0.0005 0.0018
(1.946) (1.757) (1.793) (1.199) (2.188)
IAMT 8.973 6.312 1.511 1.497 7,823
(5.054)** (17.659)** (1.290) (1.199) (6.274)**
LAMT -0.1465 -0.0996 -0.1146 0.0677 -0.2143
(-0.984) (-3.322)** (-1.167) (0.842) (-2.048)*
STDMKT 0.5459 0.3331 1.176 -0.9632 1.5092
(0.902) (2.733)** (2.946)** (-2.936)** (3.549)**
R2  0.4076 0.8151 0.5392 0.7543 0.6763
White X2 Test 41.8295* 55.0560** 59.4093** 49.7516"* 63.1337**
Notes: t-statistics are in parenthesis.
* significance at 5% level.
** significance at 1% level.
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Appendix Table 2
T-Tests for Measures of Flotation Costs for
Competitively Bid and Negotiated Utility Equity Offerings
January 1973 through September 1980
Competitively Bid Sample Negotiated Sample
Std
Mean Dev Min Max
0.456 0.471 0.120 2.450
-0.662 1.049 -2.500 4.390
3.150 1.333 1.254 10.813
4.101 2.729 0.227 18.494
3.935 0.906 2.000 5.000
Std
Mean Dev Min Max T-Stat
0.501 0.551 0.059 6.739 0.833
-0.261 0.520 -2.564 3.226 8.196**
3.918 1.223 1.780 10.450 3.874**
5.406 1.867 0.541 13.230 2.524**
3.480 1.199 1.000 6.000 2.575**
Notes: * significance at 5% level.
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Appendix Table 3
Regression Results for 70 Competitively Bid
Utility Equity Offerings
January 1973 through September 1980
Regression Method: Generalized Least Squares (GLS)
Dependent Variable
Regn. I Regn. 2 Regn. 3 Regn. 4 Regn. 5
Independent
Variable TUC EXP COMM UNDER EXP+COMM
Intercept 2.868 -0.1571 1.963 1.062 1.8058
(2.039)* (-1.011) (2.287)* (1.461) (1.975)
REG -0.6211 0.0242 -0.1941 -0.4514 -0.1698
(-2.442)* (0.863) (-1.251) (-3.434)** (-1.028)
BETA -0.3925 -0.0184 -0.1776 -0.1964 -0.1961
(-0.501) (-0.213) (-0.372) (-0.485) (-0.385)
SDERR 0.0012 0.2438 0.2953 -0.5379 0.5391
(0.001) (2.093)* (0.459) (-0.485) (0.787)
AMT -0.0034 -0.0019 -0.0002 -0.0013 -0.0021
(-0.149) (-0.772) (-0.012) (-0.0119) (-0.043)
IAMT 62.768 18.143 25.894 18.731 44.037
(1.854) (4.849)** (1.254) (1.070) (2.002)*
LAMT 1.878 0.3932 0.7745 0.7107 1.167
(0.865) (1.638) (0.585) (0.633) (0.827)
STDMKT -5.604 -1.841 -1.571 -2.192 -3.411
(-7.850)** (-2.122)* (0.328) (0.540) (0.669)
R2  0.0911 0.7702 0.1223 0.2934 0.2584
White X2 Test 1550.0** 713.9** 1480.0** 1272.0** 1643.0**
Notes: t-statistics are in parenthesis.
* significance at 5% level.
** significance at 1% level.
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Appendix Table 4
Regression Results for 468 Negotiated Utility Equity Offerings
January 1973 through September 1980
Regression Method: Generalized Least Squares (GLS)
Dependent Variable
Regn. I Regn. 2 Regn. 3 Regn. 4 Regn. 5
Independent
Variable TUC EXP COMM UNDER EXP+COMM
Intercept 1.799 -0.0945 1.218 0.6745 1.124
(8.658)** (-1.760) (8.118)** (5.634)** (7.055)**
REG 0.0848 0.0288 0.0824 -0.0264 0.1111
(2.758)** (3.618)** (3.709)** (-1.488) (4.714)**
BETA 0.2715 0.0275 0.1003 0.1437 0.1278
(2.456)* (0.962) (1.256) (2.256)* (1.507)
SDERR 1.357 0.0967 1.3114 -0.0504 1.408
(9.358)** (2.579)* (12.510)** (-0.603) (12.655)**
AMT 0.0025 0.0004 0.0015 0.0007 0.0019
(2.767)** (1.558) (2.240)* (1.293) (2.636)**
JAMT 7.041 6.191 0.5462 0.3044 6.736
(4.833)** (16.436)** (0.519) (0.363) (6.029)**
LAMT -0.2754 -0.1029 -0.1746 0.0019 -0.2774
(-2.166)* (-3.129)** (-1.900) (0.027) (-2.845)**
STDMKT 1.013 0.3758 1.399 -0.7627 1.775
(1.973) (2.833)** (3.774)** (-2.578)* (4.510)**
R2  0.5674 0.8229 0.6446 0.2448 0.7609
White X2 Test 44.80 50.65** 77.32** 67.41** 77.45**
Notes: t-statistics are in parenthesis.
* significance at 5% level.
** significance at 1% level.

